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ABSTRACT
Recent regime change literatures compellingly assert that linkage to the
West has been a significant factor in democratisation where the
organisational capacity of authoritarian incumbents has overwhelmingly
weakened pro-democracy forces. Detailed case studies confirming these
findings have not included Singapore although high levels of linkage to the
West suggest that democratisation should have taken place there. This
qualitative case study fills the empirical and theoretical gap by explaining
why linkage has so far failed to raise the cost of authoritarianism for
Singapore's government. By eschewing the current structural approach,
which conceptualises linkage as mere channels of external pressure or
influence, this analysis treats each dimension of linkage as arenas of
political interaction where external democratising pressure or influence are
generated, mediated or precluded. This agency-centred approach exposes
the politics of linkage and thereby enables us to explain why linkage to the
West does not always have the expected impact on regime change. These
findings open up the research agenda of regime change studies by pointing
the way forward for future studies of otherwise inexplicable cases where
high linkage has not led to democratisation.
Keywords: Democratisation, authoritarianism,
Southeast Asia, authoritarian stability
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INTRODUCTION
The notion that democratisation is for the most part a domestic political
process exploded when the end of the former Soviet Union corresponded
with a dramatic sweep of transitions away from communism toward the
promise of democracy (Whitehead 2001). Early efforts to understand how
the international environment impacts regime change have since continued,
re-animated by the fact that a significant number of post-Cold War, "third
wave" regime transitions have led instead to authoritarian transformations.
This trend is theoretically significant in that myriad scholarship suggested
that the overarching post-Cold War geopolitical environment was
significantly more conducive to democratisation, regional factors
notwithstanding (Whitehead 2001; Pridham et al. 1994). Exactly how the
international-domestic political interface shapes divergent regime outcomes
has remained a question of salience. Arguably, one of the most significant
contributions in this regard consists of efforts to develop a theory that
allows us to understand what international factors matter and how they
matter to regime change. A series of recent scholarship by Levitsky and
Way (2005; 2006; 2007; 2010), which culminated in a cross-regional,
medium-N case study in 2010, has made such an impact in the field by
giving us a framework to approach the complexities of the international
environment and its impact on regime change.
The purpose of this article is to re-examine a set of international
factors that the authors term collectively as "linkage to the West," in order to
understand why, contrary to their theory, they did not have a
democratisation effect on Singapore. To understand why this enterprise is of
any significance will require further elaboration of Levitsky and Way's
theory and where Singapore fits in their study. Levitsky and Way's theory
begins by positing that high levels of organisational power, derived from
state coercive capacity, party strength and state economic control, are key
domestic factors that inhibit democratisation (2010: 54–70). Authoritarian
incumbents who enjoy high levels of elite cohesion and coercive state
capacities can easily thwart oppositional challenges, explaining why many
promising transitions have culminated in hybrid "electoral authoritarian"
regimes and changed no further (Levitsky and Way 2010: 54–68). However,
their medium-N case studies showed that sustained external democratising
influence provided by linkage to the West contributed significantly to
democratisation. Defined as ties to or cross-border flows with the West,
linkage consists of at least six key dimensions—economic,
intergovernmental, technocratic, informational, social and transnational civil
society. Economic linkage consists of trade, investment and credit flows.
2
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Intergovernmental linkage consists of bilateral diplomatic and military ties
and participation in Western-led alliances, treaties and international
organisations whilst technocratic linkages refer to the share of a country's
elite educated in or with professional ties to Western-led multilateral
institutions or universities. Informational linkages refer to cross-border
telecommunications, internet connections, and Western-media penetration.
Last but not least, social linkages comprise tourism, immigration and
refugee flows and diaspora networks, whilst transnational civil society
linkages are tied to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
churches, party organisations, and other networks (Levitsky and Way 2010:
43).
Through process-tracing, their research shows that these forms of
linkage to the West tilt the balance of power against authoritarian
incumbents by heightening the salience in the West of authoritarian
government abuse, increasing the probability of an international response,
creating domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic
norms and ultimately strengthening democratic forces in relation to
autocrats. It is through these mechanisms that linkage raises the cost of
authoritarianism, making it imperative for authoritarian incumbents to
democratise as per oppositional demands. The more extensive linkages are
maintained to the West, the more likely obstacles of high organisational
capacity can be overcome. The authors also identify another means through
which external democratising pressure and influence can be channelled.
Leverage, defined as the "authoritarian governments' vulnerability to
external democratising pressure" from the West, is exercised through a
variety of ways including "political conditionality and punitive sanctions,
diplomatic pressure, and military intervention." Leverage also raises the cost
of authoritarianism, but as it tends to provide merely superficial external
pressure or influence over a limited period of time, its significance is limited
to cases where the organisational power of incumbents is already low
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 43).
Levitsky and Way's cases were chosen on the basis of being hybrid
"competitive authoritarian" regimes, where elections are not free and fair,
but allow a minimal degree of political competition such that an electoral
upset is a possibility (2010: 5). Although they do not claim to offer a general
theory that applies to all regime types, they do extend their discussion to
very similar "hegemonic authoritarian" regimes, where even a minimal
degree of political competition does not exist despite regular elections
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 34; Howard and Roessler 2006: 367). In fact, the
robustness of their theory is enhanced by the fact that even less competitive
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regimes appear mostly to comply with the general predictions of their theory
(Levitsky and Way 2010: 343). The only exception was that of Singapore, a
hegemonic authoritarian regime "which remained authoritarian despite
relatively high linkage" (Levitsky and Way 2010: 343). Because Singapore
was not in the original pool of case studies, no clear explanation was ever
provided for why it defies predictions. Yet, as Rodan and Jayasuriya point
out, the case is "starkly at odds with their theory" (Rodan and Jayasuriya
2012: 181). Since linkage to the West still impacts hegemonic authoritarian
regimes in the manner predicted by Levitsky and Way's theory, why
extensive linkage to the West does not work to channel external
democratising pressure and influence to effect regime change there seems to
demand some further explanation. Indeed, why Singapore remained immune
to the zeitgeist of democracy during a period of Western liberal hegemony,
despite high levels of linkage to the West, is both an empirical and
theoretical puzzle that needs to be addressed. This is not only because
students of Singapore's politics would appreciate a clarification as to why
the case does not "fit" the theory—the case may indeed suggest that
theoretical refinements may be necessary for a better understanding of the
international-domestic interface of regime change.
The analysis provided in this article will centre on Singapore's
linkages to the West in order to explain why these linkages did not raise the
cost of authoritarianism for the People's Action Party (PAP) government.
The first part of this analysis centres on examining the reasons for which
intergovernmental, economic and technocratic linkages had no effect on
raising the cost of authoritarianism, whilst informational linkages had only a
weak impact. I part ways with Levitsky and Way by extending the analysis
of these linkages into the Cold War period. Levitsky and Way do not do so
because they "do not expect linkages to have had similar effects during the
Cold War period" and their theory is "relevant only for periods of Western
liberal hegemony" (2010: 34). As I will show, such an approach obscures
important continuities in the way linkages behaved during both periods.
More importantly, including the Cold War period in the analysis highlights
the reasons for those continuities, rooted in the consistency of autocratic
agency and enduring Western interests, Western liberal hegemony
notwithstanding.
The second part of the analysis follows logically from the first by
suggesting that the remaining social and transnational civil society linkages
had the most potential to raise the cost of authoritarianism in Singapore.
Indeed, other studies have shown that such linkages are not insignificant
political arenas in which bottom-up pressures for democratisation can be
generated to compensate for weak external state pressure, or help to
4
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generate external state pressure (Ooi 2009 and 2013). These are empirically
rich case studies that detail social and transnational civil society linkages as
interactive arenas in which external democratising pressures are generated.
Consistent with such an approach, which best foregrounds autocratic agency,
I trace the ways in which the PAP government has consistently depoliticised
such social and civil society linkages to minimise the generation of such
pressures. The analysis focuses in particular on a critical moment in
Singapore's political history when political opening could have been
possible (late 1980s and early 1990s), and explains how decisive actions
taken by the incumbents to crackdown on politicised elements
that comprised these social and civil society linkages to the West had a
lasting depoliticising effect on these linkages. 1 This ultimately weakened
democratic forces and discouraged the development of domestic
constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic norms well into the
post-Cold War period. Wide-ranging social and transnational civil society
linkages to the West have therefore not raised the cost of authoritarianism
significantly.
What emerges from this historical case study is that a conceptual flaw
in the current theory obscures the politics of linkage and thus inhibits a
satisfactory explanation for why linkages to the West have failed to raise the
cost of authoritarianism in a high linkage case like Singapore. By treating
them as mere channels of external democratising pressure and influence, the
literature fails to treat linkages as arenas of political interaction where
external democratising pressure and influence can either be generated,
minimised or precluded. This overly structural conceptualisation thus
associates high levels of linkage with high levels of external pressure and
influence, which this case study suggests is rather contingent upon agency.
The agency-centred approach used here betters our understanding of the
international-domestic political interface within which regime change is
located. In order to situate this analysis in current conversations on regime
change, we will review how authoritarian stability in Singapore has thus far
been explained.
EXPLAINING AUTHORITATION STABILITY IN SINGAPORE
Singapore has long been a puzzle because it debunks key explanations of
democratisation—it reached a level of development by the late 1970s that
Huntington would have called the "political transition zone" without
experiencing democratic breakthrough (Huntington 1991: 60). The attendant
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social structural changes predicted by modernisationists—namely, the rise
of a liberal middle class—did not lead to substantial pressure for
democratisation (Lipset 1959). While Singapore is empirically and
theoretically exceptional on many counts, it can be understood through the
existing theoretical literature on regime change and many studies have "fit"
it into existing theoretical frameworks so that it is possible to think of
Singapore meaningfully. For example, the failure of modernisation theory to
predict authoritarian persistence in Singapore may be understood by
examining the role of capitalist and working classes and the importance of
class coalitions (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Collier 1999).
Trocki (2006) describes how the PAP politically neutered both the local
capitalist and working classes early on, preventing such strong class
coalitions from forming, confirming Khong's (1995) earlier observation of
the political impotence of Singapore's local capitalists in acquiescing to
authoritarian control for the protection the state could provide against labour
agitation, and Pereira's (2008) subsequent explanation for its continued
weakness. More recent class tensions between the middle and lower classes
have further weakened democratic forces that do exist in Singapore by
precluding the possibility of large cross sections of opposition (Tan 2004).
Dimensions of what Levitsky and Way call high organisational
capacity have also been well-developed explanations for authoritarian
stability in Singapore. The developmental state literature, for example, has
suggested that late industrialisation often necessitates a "hard state" which
exercises societal control with significant authoritarian overtones (Johnson
1982; Woo-Cumings 1999). In the case of Singapore, the hard
developmental state had already been shaped by the "counterrevolutionary
collaboration between British and local elites under late-colonial rule during
the 1940s and 1950s" (Slater 2012). Its development during the Cold War
and when the Indonesian threat to national security seemed imminent had
the effect of further hardening it. Such state-society relations continue to
exist in Singapore even in the post-industrial age (Rodan 1989; Huff 1994).
Indeed, Slater (2012) attributes authoritarian durability in Singapore to the
continued existence of the strong state. The coercive aspects of state
capacity are further maintained by archaic laws such as the Internal Security
Act (ISA), and a legal system effectively controlled by the executive and
therefore rules consistently against opposition politicians and activists in
"defamation" cases.
Party strength has also contributed to authoritarian stability in
Singapore—it is a case consistent with the statistical findings of Geddes that
single party regimes last longer than personalist and military ones (1999:
122). The high level of elite cohesion in Singapore certainly confirms the
6
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regime stabilising effect of parties and the resultant claim that single-party
regimes tend to be brought down by exogenous events and not internal splits
(Huntington 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Smith 2005; Brownlee
2007). Further, Slater (2012) has shown that the cohesion of a broad
spectrum of political, economic and social elites is very much forged by
recognised threats to their shared interests from class and communal sources.
Mass mobilisation and conflict along class and communal lines between
1945 and 1965 is said to have led to the "ordering" of elites even before
Indonesia's Konfrontasi campaign of 1963–1965 made geopolitical
vulnerability a significant source of Singapore's "insecurity complex."
(Rahim 2009). To this conversation on elite cohesion, Levitsky and Way
(2012) have added an ideational dimension, forged often through the shared
experience of violence. In Singapore's post World War II history, counterinsurgency efforts, communal violence and later, security threats from
without (Konfrontasi) helped to consolidate a generation of leadership with
what Levitsky and Way call "extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned
authority," despite the lack of nationalist heroism—helping to explain the
relative lack of factional conflict within the PAP (Levitsky and Way 2012:
871). On top of its monopolistic control over the (coercive) state apparatus,
it is this elite cohesion that has been an important source of the PAP's ability
to maintain "party strength." With the aid of the first-past-the-post electoral
system, this has led to the PAP's predominance in Parliament, which has
further allowed the PAP to develop legalistic means of punishment for those
who do not comply.
The above literatures suggest that coercive state capacity and party
strength have been mutually reinforcing, creating tremendous obstacles for
democratisation. The literatures on the evolution of Singapore's
"developmental state" also help to explain the extensive control the partystate has on the economy, however, not least through government-linked or
government-linked corporations (GLCs), which have directly competed
with local private interests after 1965 along with foreign-owned companies,
and numerous statutory boards (Trocki 2006; Rodan and Hewison 2001).
The numerous GLCs are a key source of employment for Singaporeans.
Further, the party-government's control over private savings and capital has
been exercised through GLCs such as the Development Bank of Singapore,
which remains only partially privatised today (Rodan 2004). Importantly,
economic control is also extended through that of the Central Provident
Fund (CPF)—the government-controlled compulsory savings program—
which is also a large source of financing for the majority of the population's
purchase of the Housing Development Board's expansive public housing.
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Key means of production and finance are therefore under the PAP
government's control, and this control furnishes its ability to extend political
control through myriad organisations from the media to grassroots
committees. On all three fronts—coercive state capacity, party strength and
economic control—the incumbent PAP regime thus maintains a high level
of organisational capacity.
This literature survey suggests that authoritarian stability in Singapore
should not, in fact, come as a surprise. Why extensive linkages to the West
have not raised the cost of authoritarianism for the PAP government despite
its high organisational capacity is still something that needs to be explained,
however. In this regard, Rodan and Jayasuriya suggest that Levitsky and
Way's inability to do so lies in the failure to understand how "capitalist
development fundamentally influences the nature of societal forces and the
conflicts between them" and forges "consensus politics" (2012: 181). This is
not a significant departure from the literatures cited earlier, which highlight
the political neutering of capitalist and working classes in Singapore.
Importantly, a "social foundations approach" like theirs does better capture
how the fusion of state and party created a new class of politico-bureaucrats
"predisposed toward more bureaucratic and administrative techniques of
political control and mobilisation, but also a form of state capitalism that
rendered many Singaporeans directly or indirectly dependent on the state for
economic and social resources," thus fostering "vulnerability to political cooptation and intimidation" (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2012: 186). Indeed,
systemic exposure to "an institutionalised ideology that champions the role
of technocratic elites at the expense of ideas of representation and
citizenship rights" helps to explain why democratic forces in Singapore lack
a strong social base to mount their opposition to authoritarian rule (Rodan
and Jayasuriya 2012: 186). Altogether, these socio-structural factors help us
to understand that we cannot simply assume that authoritarian regimes like
Singapore would ever democratise.
It is important to note that the focus of their explanation of
authoritarian stability in Singapore is on the inherent character of the regime,
forged through a particular path of capitalist development it took. Their
analysis of the socio-structural factors of "consensus politics" in Singapore
does not include an explanation of exactly how these domestic factors
mediate the democratising impact of linkages to the West, however.
Although their analysis is directed at Levitsky and Way's failure to explain
the case of Singapore, there remains a sense that their approach still
sidesteps the issue by reasserting the primacy of domestic factors in
accounting for authoritarian stability. How these factors impact the politics
of linkage and contribute to the failure to raise the cost of authoritarianism is
8
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still obscure. It is for this reason that this analysis focuses explicitly on the
linkages themselves.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOCRATIC AND
INFORMATIONAL LINKAGES TO THE WEST
In Levitsky and Way's work linkage to the West is conceptualised as
"transmitters of international influence," or neutral channels through which
external democratising influences flow (2010: 44). Instead of treating the six
dimensions of linkage collectively as mere channels for external
democratising pressures and influence, I analyse each dimension of linkage
in order to highlight the politics that underpin each form of linkage. By
doing so I develop my argument that the structural nature of the original
conceptualisation is a failure to understand linkages to the West as sources
of political pressure and influence, dislocating from analysis arenas of
interaction where such pressures are generated, mediated or precluded.
Table 1, which specifies the content of linkages as they apply to Singapore,
also summarises the impact that various dimensions of linkage to the West
have had on raising the cost of authoritarianism.
The extent of intergovernmental linkages Singapore maintains with
the West is well documented in myriad literatures and will not be elaborated
on here (Gillis 2005). Singapore is an active participant in 49 regional and
Western-led international organisations to date and despite its declaration of
nonalignment in the 1960s, was supportive of Western-led alliances during
the Cold War (Leifer 1986). In all areas, perhaps with the exception of
human rights, Singapore has played by international rules of the game. The
PAP government quickly established itself as the West's best bet against
communism on the island to the UK and US. Precisely because of the
leadership's positioning of Singapore in its geopolitical relationship to the
West, the latter has historically never had any vested interest in undermining
a stable, pro-West government whose existence in a Malay Muslim region
already seemed at times precarious. Despite the refusal to be openly
identified as a US ally and occasionally criticising US policy in the region,
Singapore was a consistent advocate for US military presence in the region
during the Cold War, faithfully servicing US warships and providing
training for Vietnamese officers during the Vietnam War (Guan 2009).
Today, such a symbiotic intergovernmental relationship that serves the
American national interest continues to exist as the US rebalances to the
Asia Pacific—four littoral combat ships will be deployed there by 2018 as
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tensions with China in the South China Sea builds (The Diplomat 19
February 2015). It is also for these reasons that there has historically been
no perceptible effort to either generate pressure on the PAP government or
influence the politics of Singapore through such intergovernmental linkages.
Table 1: Linkage to the West and its effect on raising the cost of authoritarianism.
Effect on Raising Cost of
Authoritarianism

Dimensions of Linkage
Intergovernmental Linkage
(Bilateral diplomatic and military ties; participation
in Western-led alliances, treaties and international
organisations)

None

Economic Linkage
(Trade, investment and credit flows)

None

Technocratic Linkage
(Western educated elites with professional ties to
Western-led multilateral institutions or universities)

None

Informational Linkage
(Western media penetration, internet)

Weak

Social Linkage
(Student and diaspora networks)

Weak

Transnational Civil Society Linkage
(International human rights NGOs, international
legal professional organisations, churches)

Weak

Similarly, economic linkages have failed to raise the cost of
authoritarianism in Singapore because it did not serve Western interests to
generate significant democratising pressure on the PAP government. The
cornerstone of the PAP's development strategy had been to provide
generous tax breaks, first class legal, financial and physical infrastructure,
an efficient bureaucracy and a highly skilled, English-speaking workforce to
attract foreign direct investment. The PAP's brand of capitalism and its
control over society yielded a stable investment environment that worked
for Western economic and political interests.2 The adroitness of Singapore's
economy is often attributed in the West to the capabilities of the PAP
leadership—supported by the social docility cultivated under strongman rule.
In the post-Cold War, post-industrial period, the PAP has preserved the
continuity of such foreign economic interests by reorienting toward a
"knowledge economy" (Finegold et al. 2004).
Further, Singapore's "economic miracle" was useful to the West in the
ideological dimensions of the Cold War. In the Cold War and early postCold War context, Singapore stood as a shining example of how economic
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linkages to the West and free market capitalism can emancipate nations
from underdevelopment or stagnation. Singapore's economic tsar Dr. Goh
Keng Swee positioned the country as a potential model for emulation to the
developing world when he stated, "If our experience can be used as a
general guide to policy in other developing countries, the lesson is that the
free enterprise system, correctly nurtured and adroitly handled, can serve as
a powerful and versatile instrument of economic growth" (Goh 1999).
Although Singapore's leadership often challenged notions of democracy and
human rights norms associated with the West, such suggestions on the
economic front lent itself to the ideological ascendency of the West during
both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and further underlined the
benefits of economic linkage to the West. Singapore also served the wider
Western agenda of reorienting China when Dr. Goh served as the economic
advisor to the State Council of China on coastal development between 1985
and 1995 (Gill et al. 2006). This has meant that the West is incentivised to
refrain from exerting pressure on the PAP government to any significant
extent. Singapore's apparent modernity and the lack of repression at a
notable scale from the late 1970s onward has made it possible for Western
governments to largely ignore the authoritarian nature of the PAP's rule, of
which they have been well aware.3
As intergovernmental and economic linkages to the West precluded
the generation of Western pressure in general, technocratic channels for
such pressures were virtually redundant. As an arena where Western
pressure or influence can be generated, technocratic linkages warrant further
discussion, however. Western pressure or influence over Singapore's
technocrats tended to be limited because Singapore came to represent
technical-bureaucratic rationality par excellence, often perceived as an
exemplar of corruption-free governance in the eyes of the West. The
pragmatism of the leadership also allowed for judicious state intervention in
the economy—which came to gain respect in technocratic circles of
international organisations like the World Bank in the 1990s as the East
Asian developmental state model began to gain currency (Birdsall et al.
1993). Moreover, the propensity of Singapore's government to exercise
fiscal prudence made it attractive to economic conservatives amongst the
technocratic and political elites of the West. The outpouring of praise from
heads of state in the West following former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's
recent passing is telling of their admiration for the strongman rule that laid
the social basis for that technical-bureaucratic rationality (Cram 2015).
It is important to note, however, that although Western influence was
not forthcoming at the technocratic level, this dimension of linkage has not
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so far served to create domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to
democratic norms in part because the success of the "Singapore model"
helped to instil a degree of pride in Singaporeans, reinforced by the
admiration of foreign technocrats that have visited to learn about
Singapore's "model" of development (Tan 2015). Of course, many of the
students who went abroad to study at institutions of higher education in the
UK and US were largely government sponsored from the late 1970s onward,
and their future (well-paid) careers were predicated on the assumption of
loyalty to the party-government (Wah Piow Tan, interview 18 December
2007).4 However, there is an ideational dimension that cannot be discounted.
Singapore's economic success has allowed the "institutionalised ideology
that champions the role of technocratic political elites," as Rodan and
Jayasuriya (2012) have pointed out, to forge a strong identity amongst
themselves and the wider middle classes employed by state apparatus or
industries related to the state. The logic of technical-bureaucratic rationality
continued to frame the reorientation strategy toward the knowledge
economy in the 1990s, reinforcing this ideology (Leong 2011). As the West
continues to ignore, for the most part, the authoritarian aspects of
Singapore's state capitalism, technocratic linkages are unlikely to be a
source of Western influence that creates constituencies with a state in
adhering to democratic norms, or indeed, become an arena where external
pressure that strengthens democratic forces in Singapore is generated.
Last in this discussion is that of informational linkages to the West,
which potential to raise the cost of authoritarianism is twofold. Outward
flows of information on authoritarian abuse from Singapore to the West can
heighten its salience there and increase the probability of an international
response. Inward flows of information from the West on the virtues of—
Western liberal values, ideas and institutions can create domestic
constituencies with a stake in adhering to domestic norms by, for example,
framing problems such as the lack of accountability as a symptom of
authoritarian rule. Whilst telecommunications technologies in the 1970s and
1980s lent themselves more easily to censorship, such infrastructure has
been well established for international commercial reasons. Control of
Western-media penetration in Singapore was much tighter in the 1970s and
1980s, and subject to more effective censorship from time to time before the
advent of the internet. Since informational linkage to the West was
unavoidable, however, the PAP leadership's strategy has been to
circumscribe the content related to the authoritarian nature of Singapore's
government as much as possible. The 1986 Newspaper and Printing Presses
(Amendment) Act was thus introduced to provide the government the right
to restrict the circulation of foreign publications deemed to engage in the
12
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domestic affairs of Singapore (Seow 1998). The numerous defamation suits
filed against international news agencies and foreign journalists critical of
its authoritarian rule in the compliant courtrooms of Singapore is also part
of this strategy. Although this prong of the PAP's strategy really began with
intensity during the late 1980s and 90s, it has carried on into the 2000s.5 Of
course, this had the effect of advertising the authoritarian nature of the PAP
government to the West, suggesting that the PAP leadership was most
interested in mediating the effects of the inward flow of information in the
age of Western liberal hegemony. It is in such an ideological context that
the "Asian values" discourse promulgated by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
should also be understood as yet another prong of the PAP's strategy to
mediate the impact of informational linkages with the West (Zakaria 1994).
Indeed, the inevitability of such linkages necessitated an "Asian values"
counter-discourse founded on the self-confidence of the pre-1997
"economic miracle."
Informational linkages have, indeed, heightened the salience in the
West of authoritarian government abuse, not least because of the PAP
leadership's strategy to shape the content of the information flowing into
Singapore from the West. That this did not increase the likelihood of an
international response and help to generate external pressure requires that
we reference the intergovernmental and economic linkages that
disincentivised Western governments from strong reactions to crackdowns
on media freedom. Informational linkages are nevertheless considered to
have had some limited impact in creating domestic constituencies with a
stake in adhering to democratic norms. Between the late 1980s and early
1990s, whether and how Singapore should liberalise in response to the
zeitgeist of democracy sweeping through various regions of the world,
including East Asia, became a concern of the government, reflecting the
perceived need to forestall the possibility of anything resembling a people
power movement. It has not been possible to truncate informational linkages
with the West for commercial reasons, nor to successfully circumscribe the
inflow of information, such that Western liberal democratic ideas and values
would not take some hold. This has, indeed, become much more difficult
since the widespread use of the internet, but is associated, of course, with
extensive social linkages to the West.
That neither technocratic, intergovernmental and economic linkages
to the West have raised the cost of authoritarianism by generating and
channelling external pressure or influence is evidenced, amongst other
things, by the way in which Western-led international organisations have
not hesitated to hold its meetings in Singapore. For example, in 2006,
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President Wolfowitz criticised the PAP government for banning protests
during the World Bank meeting, yet a steady working relationship continued
(New York Times 15 September 2006). Informational linkages have had
some impact in raising the cost of authoritarianism by helping to make
Singaporeans aware of how accountability and responsiveness can be at
stake when such institutions are not strong, especially in recent years. 6 This,
however, is the extent of Western influence, as there has been no intent on
the part of the West to take further action to undermine the stability and
durability of a regime that has served Western interests so well. This
agency-centred approach helps us to better perceive the enduring political
and economic interests of the West at play with policies and actions of the
PAP leadership to preclude and mediate the potential impact of these
dimensions of linkage.
As such, we turn our attention now to social and civil society linkages.
Our analysis so far implies that the grassroots nature of these forms of
linkage may offer a greater potential in heightening the salience of
authoritarian government abuse to the West, increase the probability of an
international response and strengthening democratic forces in relation to
autocrats. Other detailed empirical studies have shown that social and
transnational civil society actors that make up such linkages have in other
cases generated external pressures that have helped to effect democratisation
in Taiwan and South Korea by framing authoritarian abuses as human rights
violations (Ooi 2009; 2013). Indeed, the Helsinki Process (1973–1975)
brought about an international normative shift where human rights became a
legitimate international concern that could affect interstate relations.
Transnational human rights organisations proliferated worldwide,
empowered by this new normative environment to frame authoritarian abuse
as morally reprehensible human rights violations that required international
censure (Thomas 2001). Despite such a favourable normative environment,
social and civil society actors that attempted to generate external
democratising pressure by appealing to the moral conscience of the West
nevertheless failed in Singapore. The approach taken in the following
analysis foregrounds the politics of such forms of linkage by taking a
similarly agency-centred approach. The rich empirical details in this section
reveal social and transnational civil society linkages as arenas of political
interaction—where grassroots actors work to generate external
democratising pressures whilst the target government takes action to
preclude and resist such pressures. This approach, as we shall see, better
explains why such social and transnational civil society linkages failed to
raise the cost of authoritarianism appreciably. By highlighting the role of
autocratic agency in mediating the impact of such linkages, we further
14
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understand why the quantity of linkages matters less than the nature of these
linkages.
SOCIAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY LINKAGES TO THE WEST
Social and transnational civil society linkages were extensive and diffuse in
the case of Singapore precisely because its colonial history created a pattern
of population flows with the West that spread these transnational networks
thin. Political exiles and emigrants could be found in many Englishspeaking Western countries such as UK, Canada, US, Australia and New
Zealand but the globalised outlook of Singapore society also helped to
establish linkages to other Western European countries. Importantly, the
diffuse pattern of social and transnational civil society linkages rendered
them vulnerable to disruption at key historical moments by the PAP
government. Further, actions taken to disrupt such linkages in the short run
had the longer term impact of depoliticising the actors that make up such
linkages, concomitant with efforts to do so with domestic civil society.
Indeed, the depoliticisation of social and transnational civil society
linkages is not divorced from the PAP government's longstanding
management of society (Lee 2005). This process is well recorded and
analysed by others, who have shown that the general quiescence of the
1960s and 1970s could not be replicated in the 1980s and 1990s, however,
and outright repression had to be replaced by co-optive methods that
nevertheless subordinated "civic society" to the state agenda thereafter (Koh
and Ooi 2004). What is often missed is the management of the relationships
that are formed between societal groups that provide "alternative
constructions of the 'truths' of societal situations" and solidarist associations
or movements abroad, which had the potential to heighten the salience in the
West of authoritarian government abuse, increase the probability of an
international response, or strengthen the political opposition (Chua 2000).
Where such groups express sympathies or openly support the PAP's political
competitors, they are treated as potential rival centres of power and dealt
with accordingly. For example, following the Helsinki Process, one of the
more prominent Catholic activists in Singapore, Father Patrick Goh,
attempted to set up a Human Rights Committee opposed to detention
without trial and other arbitrary restrictions of freedom. This committee,
established in 1977 as transnational human rights networks proliferated
worldwide, consisted of the political opposition previously detained under
the ISA. Because of the leftist leanings of those involved, this initiative was
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alleged to be a front organisation for a communist revival and quickly
disbanded (Amnesty International 1978). From then on, only ecumenical
organisations that avoided challenging the PAP government and its policies
or supporting the political opposition were allowed to exist. The precedent
that this episode of repression set, along with a decade of spectacular
economic growth, led to a period of social quiescence.
By 1981, J. B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party became the first
opposition politician to be elected into Parliament since 1965. Importantly, a
group of liberal minded lawyers, Christian social workers, student leaders
and other members of the professional middle class critical of various
aspects of government policy began to join or show sympathy to the
opposition Workers' Party. By 1984, the growing electoral strength of the
opposition became more apparent, as two opposition candidates were
elected to Parliament and the PAP garnered only 62 percent of the vote in
the general election of that year. By the mid-1980s, civic organisations that
challenged state orthodoxy, such as the Association of Action and Research
for Women (AWARE), also began to appear. Although the political
opposition remained weak, by the late 1980s the possibility of political
change presented itself in the form of the zeitgeist of democracy, which
seemed to have swept across the globe. Importantly, a new generation of
leaders in the ruling PAP was poised to take the reins at around the same
time—and had hinted at the possibility of a new era of political
liberalisation in keeping with these international trends. These international
and domestic developments thus encouraged a nucleus of dissension to form,
bringing together independent social activists and the political opposition.
Two important breeding grounds for extra-parliamentary political
opposition emerged in the 1980s—the Law Society and the Catholic Church.
Many of their members were Western-educated, and maintained social,
professional and organisational ties to the West, sometimes via parts of Asia
which had more liberal political environments or had experienced people
power movements. In other words, politicised social and transnational civil
society linkages were forming.
It was thus in May 1987 that the PAP government dramatically
revealed that they had smashed a transnational network of Christian
ecumenical organisations and lawyers with links to international human
rights organisations and certain student activists abroad. These were
accused of being Marxists who planned to violently overthrow the
government and establish a socialist order in Singapore. To date, scholars
have failed to understand Operation Spectrum as an attack on transnational
civil society and social linkages to the West—politicising over a period of
time—that could have strengthened the political opposition by lending them
16
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international support (Barr 2008). Yet, the words of then-Home Affairs
Minister Jayakumar betray this intent, "The Government could have decided
let's wait, don't do anything. Wait for two, three years… But that means that
the network would have proliferated (New York Times 21 June 1987).
Indeed, dissent from within the legal profession was particularly
troublesome to the PAP government precisely because lawyers were
conversant with the legal means of political repression and societal control,
and had connections with international human rights organisations that were
focused on the rule of law. One of the first signs of resistance to
authoritarian rule came in 1986, when the Law Society publicly criticised
amendments that were made to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act to
restrict the foreign press from circulating reports on political issues in
Singapore—an attempt to manage informational linkages to the West. In
January 1986, an independent-minded former Attorney General, Francis
Seow, became president of the Law Society and under his tenure the Society
demanded that the body be consulted on a a variety of judicial and legal
appointments. At the LAWASIA Biennial Conference on 29 June 1987, for
example, he appealed to "concerned and caring international
organizations… to exert pressure on the Singapore government to put [the
accused] on trial in a court of law or release them" (Seow 1994: 137). Such
appeals did not fall on deaf ears—some 200 organisations worldwide
protested the detention of the 22 individuals rounded up in Operation
Spectrum, much to the chagrin of the PAP government and possibly a
reason for which most of them were not long released despite the leeway for
indefinite detention provided by the ISA (The Straits Times 27 June 1987).
Seow was a particular threat to authoritarian continuity in Singapore
at this time of leadership transition. Forced to resign from the office of Law
Society president, he joined the Workers' Party in August 1988 to contest
the September general elections. Crowds gathered in significant numbers
during Workers' Party campaign rallies and the PAP won by only a very
narrow margin in Eunos Constituency. Interestingly, Seow was later
arrested under the ISA for being a willing partner to "foreign interference"
in Singapore's internal affairs in some unspecified plot to undermine the
PAP government (New York Times 21 June 1987). Specifically, US
diplomats, including Mason Hendrickson, were accused of meddling in
Singapore politics by encouraging Seow to enter politics, while Seow was
accused of receiving monies from the American government and seeking to
secure the possibility of political asylum in the US should there be reprisals
for challenging the PAP (Seow 1994: 121–45). These accusations highlight
the importance placed by the PAP government on truncating transnational
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civil society and social linkages that could strengthen the political
opposition.
This particular episode strained US-Singapore relations at the time
(New York Times 12 May 1988). While transnational civil society and social
linkages to the West had already helped to create the outpouring of
international disapproval for the crackdown on Seow and the "Marxist
conspirators," such accusations compelled US Secretary of State Schultz to
discuss the case with Singapore officials, implying that private diplomatic
pressure could have been applied at this time (New York Times 21 June
1987). There were no further repercussions down the road as economic and
intergovernmental cooperation continued, however. Amnesty International
nevertheless named Seow (and later, all 22 detainees of Operation Spectrum)
a "prisoner of conscience" to highlight his plight and upon release, Human
Rights Watch invited him to the US, where he has remained since
November 1988 to publish three books to continue raising the profile of the
PAP government's brand of authoritarian rule in the West (Associated Press
22 August 1988; Seow 1994: 256).
Connections that local lawyers had with international human rights
organisations such as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) was also
troublesome because the ICJ kept a close eye on the use of law for
repressive purposes in Singapore, and had in the past even helped to procure
external counsel in defamation cases, periodically filed by the PAP
leadership against the parliamentary opposition to bankrupt and disqualify
them from their seat. The ICJ sent a fact-finding mission to Singapore in
July 1987, interviewing Seow, opposition parliamentarian J. B. Jeyaretnam,
and the family and friends of those "Marxist conspirators," presenting their
findings in a publicly circulated report that discredited the PAP
government's claims of a Marxist conspiracy (New York Times 21 June
1987). The ICJ also invited Seow to a conference in Bangkok in December
1987 and June 1988 to further raise international awareness of political
repression in Singapore. Other organisations such as the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights (later, Human Rights First) and the
International Human Rights Law Group also served as expert witnesses
during US Congressional Hearings over the human rights situation in
Singapore, which took place as a result of urgings by human rights activists
during this times. 7 In short, linkage to these international human rights
organisations not only heightened the salience in the West of authoritarian
government abuse, it strengthened a nascent opposition movement.
Indeed, efforts to raise the international profile of Operation Spectrum
did in fact help to generate some external pressure on the PAP
government—the US Congress and even the European Parliament called for
18
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the immediate release of the ISA detainees, or an open trial (New York
Times 21 June 1987). Members of the New Zealand Parliament expressed
public concern in April 1988, as did members of the Japanese Diet, when
rearrests were made of those who had been previously released in 1987
(Rerceretnam 2006). These concerns were raised precisely because of the
outcry stirred up by human rights activists, Christian churches and
ecumenical organisations abroad, along with student bodies that objected to
the use of the ISA to crack down on seemingly innocent individuals.
However, Western countries did not use other heavy handed approaches
such as economic sanctions to exert pressure on the PAP government,
consistent with the earlier claim that Western economic and political
interests vested in the Singapore leadership did, in fact, disincentivise an
outright campaign to delegitimise the PAP government. Activists from such
international human rights organisations would soon find themselves closely
observed or obstructed from entering Singapore. The PAP government also
disrupted these linkages by making an example of those who tried to
establish contact with any kind of foreigners that could help to generate
external pressure at this time—lawyer Patrick Seong, for example, was
labelled a "propagandist" and later detained simply for providing
information to the foreign press during the 1987 arrests (The Online Citizen
26 May 2009). Another way the PAP government disrupted those linkages
was by framing the international support given to the ISA detainees as
"foreign interference" in the domestic affairs of Singapore, making it clear
to social activists, the political opposition and all potential dissidents in
Singapore that any foreign support they gained would be considered a threat
to national security and treated accordingly (Seow 1994: 107). Such moves
had the dual effect of immediately causing independently-constituted civil
society groups to dissociate themselves in the short term from their Western
counterparts, while depoliticising them in the longer run.
Another important source of potential opposition during the 1980s
came from within Christian ecumenical organisations. Ten of the original 16
detainees of Operation Spectrum had worked for Catholic ecumenical
organisations concerned with issues of social justice and human rights, or
were members of Catholic student organisations with connections to other
such organisations abroad (Barr 2008: 228–46). Indeed, the "Marxist"
aspect of the alleged conspiracy referenced in part the history of progressive
social activism of the targeted Christian groups in Singapore and in part
"liberation theology," which had more recently played a role in the
democratic breakthrough in South Korea and the Philippines (Straits Times
20 August 1987; Richburg 1987). This growing Christian movement was, in
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fact, increasingly multidenominational and thus potentially broad-based.
Even more worrying for the PAP government were their linkages to similar
organisations across Western societies, which support could strengthen the
political opposition. The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA), which was
shut down because of its support of the "Marxist conspirators," was just
such an example of a regional, multidenominational ecumenical
organisation linked to a larger international organisation, the World Council
of Churches (WCC).
Indeed, numerous church and ecumenical leaders in Australia and
Japan, South Korea and other places in Asia such as the Philippines,
protested Operation Spectrum and advocated for the release of those
detained without prospect of trial (O'Grady 1990: 13–22). The CCA further
mounted a campaign against the arrests of the "Marxist conspirators" from
its subsidiary bodies in Hong Kong and some of its member Councils of
Churches (Rerceretnam 2006: 20). Further, the Asian Human Rights
Commission, linked to the CCA, sent a fact-finding mission in July 1987
along with the ICJ, which concluded in its report that those detained should
be "defended and applauded" (Asian Human Rights Commission 1987: 27).
The CCA also financially supported the ad hoc Emergency Committee for
Human Rights in Singapore (ECHRS), based in Christchurch, New Zealand,
which produced fortnightly newsletters between May 1987 and October
1988 to publicise and inform on Operation Spectrum. The Ecumenical News
Service of the World Council of Churches carried news of the crackdowns
abroad while in May 1988, recommendations were made at the Churches
Commission on International Affairs—an advisory body of the WCC—that
the WCC boycott Singapore Airlines when rearrests were made the month
before (O'Grady 1990: 13–22). The WCC did just that. In the midst of such
external pressure, the PAP leadership was determined to crush the
progressive Catholic leadership which had reaffirmed the need for the
Church to engage in issues of social justice, support the detainees and was
receptive of international support. Four such Catholic priests were pressured
into resigning after a meeting with Prime Minister Lee was held with the
Catholic leadership. The Archbishop was later compelled to issue
ecclesiastical sanctions on them and to shut down the Catholic Center.
These priests left separately for Europe, Canada and Australia, effectively
disrupting this aspect of transnational civil society linkages to the West at
the time.
Social linkages to the West, in the particular form of Singaporean
students and political exiles living abroad, were also targeted by the PAP
government because of their potential to generate and channel external
pressure or influence on the new generation of PAP leaders. Tan Wah Piow,
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named the sinister mastermind of the "Marxist Conspiracy," was at the time
a law student at Oxford University after having been forced to leave the
country for anti-Vietnam war student activism in the 1970s. Tan led the
Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and Singapore Students'
Organizations (FUEMSSO) and was viewed as a threat precisely because
his position gave him the potential to politicise and influence returning
students. The Hong Kong-based Asian Students Association (ASA), which
maintained connections to FUEMSSO, was also held in suspicion for
politicising returning students.8 Further, a connection between the Catholic
progressive movement, Tan, and local students was apparently appearing.
Thus, many of the ISA detainees had been members of the Polytechnic
Students' Union involved with Catholic ecumenical organisations or
members of the Catholic Association of Polytechnic Students. Operation
Spectrum disrupted these social linkages and the potential they had to
nurture and support the political opposition in Singapore. Indeed, Tan and
other former student activists based in Hong Kong and Europe formed the
European Committee on Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore
(KEHMA-S) to protest Operation Spectrum, vindicating PAP suspicions of
these transnational networks' ability to generate external pressure and bring
it to bear on them.9
However, what the PAP government may not have grasped was that
the students most active in generating external pressure would be based in
Australia, since fewer of them were dependent upon government
scholarships. An important student organisation that actively objected to
Operation Spectrum was collectively known as the Network of Overseas
Student Collectives in Australia (NOSCA). Interestingly, NOSCA
maintained extensive links with regional and international nongovernmental
organisations organised around causes that spanned across a wide range of
issue areas, making them particularly well-connected. NOSCA organised
the Malaysia Singapore Human Rights Commission, held public meetings
about the "Marxist Conspiracy," published literature, ran media campaigns
and lobbied other student organisations and Australian politicians to support
the detainees of Operation Spectrum over 1987–1988. These efforts
prompted the Australian government to raise the issue at a regional foreign
ministers' meeting (US State Department 1982: 798). In 1989, NOSCA even
staged a public protest in Sydney to embarrass visiting Brigadier-General
Lee Hsien Loong. It is not surprising that the PAP government publicly
acknowledged that the greatest degree of external pressure came from
nongovernmental organisations based in Australia (The Straits Times 27
June 1987).
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The 1987 arrests served as a focal point for the above transnational
civil society and social actors to converge their efforts on heightening the
salience in the West of authoritarian government abuse and to increase the
probability of an international response. This was an important moment in
Singapore's political history because the impending leadership transition
could have sensitised the leadership to external pressure. Owing to actions
taken to truncate these linkages, only limited pressure could be generated,
however. Efforts to depoliticise civil society and other social actors and
their linkages to the West had a lasting impact into the post-Cold War
period, explaining why these linkages have not since generated any
appreciable external pressure that could have raised the cost of
authoritarianism for the PAP government. Although inherent structural
weaknesses rendered these forms of linkage to the West susceptible, the
deliberate policy of the PAP to depoliticise these linkages is a significant
factor for which they have not had the kind of impact suggested by the
current literature.
Indeed, subsequent to Operation Spectrum, the PAP government
began vigorously shaping the discourse on civil society by redefining it as
"civic society" (Lee 2005). Brigadier General George Yeo's 1991
promulgation of the term "civic society" stressed civic responsibilities rather
than the rights of citizenship, whilst the subsequent policy of marginalising
a handful of groups that refused to be so co-opted effectively depoliticised
civil society and subordinated it to state preferences. Under Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong, the term "civil society" was reintroduced with little
appreciable difference in substance to the earlier understanding. Importantly,
the "Marxist Conspiracy" debacle etched in public memory the dangers of
politicised linkages with the West, and the many international
nongovernmental organisations in Singapore today are also mindful of the
parameters of operation. An example of one organisation with social and
civil society linkages to the West may suffice to explain the consistency of
the PAP's policies—that of the Singaporeans for Democracy (SFD),
established in 2010. Led by an internationally-based Singaporean academic,
the SFD worked closely with the United Nations Human Rights Council on
the Universal Periodic Review process and stressed the maintenance of
relationships with similar international nongovernmental organisations. It
was dissolved in 2012 after protracted legislative obstacles to its registration
presented by the PAP government.
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CONCLUSION
S. R. Joey Long once observed of Singapore that, "the notion of an island
entity—geographically situated at one of the most important and strategic
economic crossroads in the world—that is impervious to external influences
and developments is conceptually limited and historically unrealistic" (2011:
216). Regime change in Singapore cannot be understood without locating it
at the international-domestic political interface. The theoretical framework
provided by Levitsky and Way (2010) does just that. Unfortunately, the
structural approach they have taken in the conceptualisation of linkages to
the West has presented obstacles to a better understanding of why linkage to
the West sometimes fails to raise the cost of authoritarianism. The analysis
provided here helps us to rethink linkages to the West as inherently political
by foregrounding the agency and process through which external pressure
and influence are generated, minimised or precluded by state and nonstate
actors that are an inherent part of these linkages. By reconceptualising
linkages as sites of political interaction, we are better able to see more
specifically how autocratic agency can mediate the impact of
intergovernmental, economic, technocratic, informational, social and
transnational civil society linkages to the West. Indeed, a closer examination
of each dimension of Singapore's linkage to the West has revealed that not
all dimensions of linkage have served to generate or channel external
pressure or influence on the PAP government, depending on what policies
and actions it has pursued. This observation suggests that a structural
approach that treats linkage as mere channels of external democratising
pressure or influence fails to give due attention to the politics of each
dimension of linkage to the West. The agency-centred approach is arguably
much truer to the purpose of Levitsky and Way's theoretical framework,
which is meant to capture the international-domestic political interface of
regime change (2010). The extent to which the claims made here are
generalisable remains to be seen through other detailed studies of cases
where linkages to the West have not led to democratisation. While this is
beyond the scope of the present undertaking, rethinking linkage to the West
in the way suggested here certainly opens up the research agenda in the field
of regime change studies in a new direction not suggested by the current
literature.
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Regime and Taiwan's Democratization" and "The Transnational Protection Regime
and Democratic Breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea." She also contributes
feature articles to The Diplomat and other news media outlets.
The increasingly popular opposition Workers Party, whose appeal to the electorate for
a "First World Parliament" that could hold the PAP government accountable during
the 2011 General Elections, further underlines the awareness Singaporeans have of
Western liberal democratic institutions and their value, drawing comparisons with
their own political institutions.
According to the World Bank, foreign direct investment ranged around 6–14 percent
of Singapore's GDP between 1980 and 1991 a comparatively high level amongst
developing countries. World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/singapore
(accessed 10 September 2015).
US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights has consistently registered
concerns over the use of the Internal Security Act in Singapore since 1975, along with
increasing restrictions on press freedom and civil society and long-held political
detainees. Human Rights organisations have also raised issues with long-held political
detainees, and importantly reported on the subtle legalistic means through which
political dissent has been muzzled in widely available reports. For example, when
Amnesty International started reporting on Singapore in 1975, it raised concerns about
how the Banishment Act was used to hold some detainees indefinitely without trial
without having to resort to the Internal Security Act.
See also Singapore and Malaysian British Association (SiMBA) Newsletter, 5 July
1994, 3. SiMBA was a UK-based student organisation.
In 2002, for example, Bloomberg paid large damages to the political leadership and
issued a high profile public apology for suggesting the practice of nepotism in the top
leadership ranks. In 2006, the Far East Economic Review was forced to pay
US$290,000 to the Lee family in an out-of-court settlement for an allegedly
defamatory article.
The increasingly popular opposition Workers Party, whose appeal to the electorate for
a "First World Parliament" that could hold the PAP government accountable during
the 2011 General Elections, further underlines the awareness Singaporeans have of
Western liberal democratic institutions and their value, drawing comparisons with
their own political institutions.
United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Recent
Developments in Malaysia and Singapore 1988: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, 7 July
and 22 September 1988 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1988).
There is evidence that ASA and FUEMSSO had begun to make contact since 1981
signalling a coalescing student movement abroad in the aftermath of attempts to
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suppress the student movement in Singapore in the mid-1970s. See Fijar No. 14
October 1981, 14. Fijar was the monthly publication of FUEMMSO.
See 2nd Press Statement, European Committee for Human Rights in Malaysia and
Singapore, Brussels, 10 March 1989.
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